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—
—
was for Europe’s

lease as part of debt repayment due to Sri Lanka’s default) raises caution for populations of

How Big is China’s Belt and Road

’

’
arshall Plan and “America First”

e Raises Transparency Issues with China’s Belt and Road

measure up to the international community’s articulated expectations as to responsible

(5) China’s own commitment to adhere to

China: ‘Belt and Road’ Projects Should Respect Rights

U.N. Int’l Conference on Financing for Developmen
–
–
A Human Rights Focus to Upgrade China’s International Lending,
–
“P

”

–
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based approach to … international cooperation,

ns that it should, among others, “consider the establishment of a legal
not negatively impact human rights abroad… [and] [t]ake further measures on business and
Principles on Business and Human Rights.”
I will address certain “human rights imperialism”
against the “rights based approach to development,”
crystallizing “right to development.”
focused on the centrality of human rights to “legislation, administrative practice, and policy
delivery,”

—

—

Beyond ‘Rights Based Approaches’? Employing a Process and
’
Based Approach: How ‘Human Rights’ Entered
–
’
’

“D

”

’

—
—

the World Bank’s sup

as the People’s Republic of China’s announcement of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

n detailing China’s grand dramatic geopolitical vision for

’

India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia

European Comm’n

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment, and Finance Landscape,
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/86739.htm; Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n and the Gov’t of the H.K.
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Arrangement on Supporting Hong Kong’s Participation in the Belt and Road
China’s Arctic Policy,

–

; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China,

https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/14216.htm; The Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n,
–
(2017); The Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n & the Nat’l Energy Administration of

https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/13694.htm; The Ministry of Envtl. Prot. of the People’s Republic of China,

’

’
; Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Culture’s

https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12479.htm; Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China,
’
Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China, et al.,

Supreme People’s Court, Opinions on the People’s Courts Providing Judicial Services and Guarantees for the

of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China,

te the “Belt and Road” Special Plan for

the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Belt and Road’ Vision and Actions for Cooperation in
Institutions of the ‘Belt & Road’ Initiative: A Systematic Literature Review,
’

BRI’s contractual, legal, and financial arrangements with debtor countries is not standardized
keeping with Deng Xiaoping’s famous
(“hide brightness and cherish
obscurity”) foreign policy strategy,
outsiders’ optimism and pessimism regarding the BRI’s development consequences for

predominantly from a single sovereign source, the People’s Republic of China. (Although it

The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s Grand Diplomacy,
’

–

–
–

–

’
’

–

’

–
–

’
–
’
China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: Mapping the World Trade Normative
Lying Low No More?: China’s New Thinking on the
’
Five Myths About China’s Belt and Road Initiative
See Inside China’s Plan to Create a Modern Silk Road
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Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in Beijing, China’s President Xi
Jinping described the BRI as exemplifying China’s grand vision for global development,
China’s state

other's core interests and major concerns…Some regions along the ancient

…

…Infrastructure

’
, China’s Xi
’, CNBC (Apr. 27, 2019, 7:47 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/27/belt

can be ‘

connect networks of highways, railways and sea ports…Third, we should
build the Belt and Road into a road of opening up….
[…]

broad community of shared interests. […]

scholarship in Chinese academic journals themselves superlatively depict the BRI as “a
ance;” “China’s grand diplomacy;” “shaping a
Century;” “China’s Exploration in the Construction of International
Institutions;” China creating a “Regional Community of Common Destiny;” “China’s
Marshall Plan;” with China’s vast “pot
the laws that establish its order.”

The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s Grand Diplomacy,
’
’
“

” Initiative and China’s Exploration in the Construction of International

Conceptual Analysis of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Road Towards a Regional
’
“
” Initiative: China’s Marshall Plan
’
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Bank used the following graphic to illustrate the 71 economies located in the BRI’s transport

As described by China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of

Road is designed to go from China’s coast to Eur
China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast

r are closely related to the BRI. […]”
including “an Artic ‘Ice Silk Road’…extend[ing] to more than 71 countries, together
[comprising] up to 65% of the world’s po
of 2017.” The unprecedented scale of these projects run parallel with China’s global drive
for resources, that according to an environmental scholar, creates a “dizzying variety of
—
—
biodiversity.”
United States’ Marshall Plan (the postwar European Recovery Program),

[…] It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do

Press Release, Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n & Ministry of Com. of the People’s Republic of China,

William Laurance, “The Dark Legacy of China’s Drive for Global Resources”, Yale Environment 360, 28
”
‘
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will not constitute foreign aid but rather creates a global program for financing China’s
projects with strategic partners along the “Belt and Road.” The March 2018 Amendment
to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China enshrined the
principles include “a new vision for development ”

Upholding absolute Party leadership over the people’s forces;

Thirteenth National People’s Congress, Xianfa Xiuzheng’an, (The Amendments to the Constitution of the
People’s Republic of China), 1st Sess., Mar. 11, 2018, http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4866_0_7.html.

Upholding the principles of ‘one country, two systems’ and promoting

Noting China’s vision for development, the March 2018 Amendment to China’s

A May 2019 article of Chinese President Xi Jinping, titled “Deepening Understanding
ent,” speaks of China’s creation of “development models

Thirteenth National People’s Congress, Xianfa Xiuzheng’an, (The Amendments to the Constitution of the
e’s Republic of China), art. 32, 1st Sess., Mar. 11, 2018,
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that give full play to [China’s] first mover advantages.”

This gives substance to China’s

Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development defines the right to development as “an
.”
same Article 1 goes on to emphasize that the “human right to development also implies
their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.”
and cultural rights themselves: “the right to development is an inalienable human right,
symbolizing dignity and honor…a means of eliminating poverty [that] provides the
ights…the right to development is

rights, and obtaining civil and political rights.”
The subtle but significant difference between these two conceptions lies with China’s

In this sense, China’s
the right to development dovetails with another scholar’s observations that:

statist political and economic agendas using the language of rights…it is

The Right to Development: China’s Philosophy, Practice, and Contribution
’

’

’

on the right to development that this paper examines China’s vision, actions, and
commitments in its BRI. Clearly, the BRI is “not a selfless venture”, and it is “not China’s
Marshall Plan”.
involve China’s state

–
vehicle for “China’s economic statecraft.”

–

Globalizing China’s paradigm

The Belt and Road Initiative is Not China’s Marshall Plan
Reports of China Using its ‘Belt and Road’ Program for Military Purposes are ‘No
Real Surprise’
Defining China’s Grand Strategy and the Future World Order 1, 2 (Mar. 2018) (unpublished Master’s thesis,
To Join or Not to Join? State Ownership, Commercial Interests, and China’s Belt
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Other scholars have elaborated on this paradigm, contrasting China’s development financing
paradigm’s differen
composition and approach of China’s lending portfolio; and (3) the governance of China’s
China’s development financing paradigm has been
…Chinese national [development finance institutions or DFIs] operating

In terms of lending practices, China’s national DFIs operating abroad tend
–
we term in this article ‘coordinated credit spaces’. The NDB, on a smaller

MDBs, following an individual project finance approach….
currency…[a]ll of these DFIs expect to be repaid in the currency that they
lend in, with the exception of China’s policy banks, which hav

rn DFIs have done until recently…
With respect to governance, China’s national DFIs have a single
shareholder governance structure…Unlike the Western

procurement conditions at times at the project level…
The absence of policy conditions to China’s development financing has been argued as

ment finance “is indifferent to risk, in particular it is uncorrelated with indices of
political stability and rule of law…[s]ome major borrowers from China have encountered
debt sustainability problems while other borrowers are in good fiscal shape…Chines
be evolving towards those norms.”
been used to emphasize the rise of the “Beijing Consensus,”
“Washington Consensus” th
The main types of China’s financing into the BRI projects have been identified as: (1)

BRI

projects

themselves

appear

to

frequently

change

according

to

China’s

I as a ‘debt trap’ for lower income countries, China’s Ministry

David Dollar & John L. Thornton, Is China’s Development Finance a Challenge to the International Order?
Is the “Beijing Consensus” Now Dominant?,
Debating China’s Economic Growth: The Beiji

’

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Recalibration and New Opport
It’s a (Debt) Trap! Managing China
’
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“with the aim to promote sustainable economic and social development
countries while ensuring debt sustainability.”
framework is disavowed immediately by China’s Ministry of Finance as “a non
risks according to the risk rating results, as an important reference for lending decisions.”

There is nothing in the text of this document that indicates whether China’s Ministry of
debtor country’s assumption of debt. The document tacitly conveys that the onus falls more
borrowers, rather than reining in China’s financing for BRI projects that might not meet any

The seeming ambiguity of China’s views about its role and responsibility as a sovereign
ith China’s stated commitments
during its Third Universal Periodic Review before the Human Rights Council, where China’s
Foreign Minister hailed China’s “human rights achievements, human rights
development path, and the country’s determination to prom
situation…China has decided to accept 284 out of 346 recommendations put forward by
various parties.”
“promote measures that ensure that development and infrastructure projects inside and

New Data on the “Debt Trap”
China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price is Too High
’

–
Dell’Erba et al.,
’
’

commitments from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”
recommendation to “[c]onsider the establishment
rights abroad…[t]ake further measures on business and human rights in line with its
Human Rights.”
China’s obligations as a treaty party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
ts in 2014 “to adopt a human rights

iving countries.”
The clamor for transparency and predictability with respect to China’s most massive
under China’s own voluntarily stated commitments to the UN Hu

labour and human rights in China’s international investment agreements.
“[p]arties shall accoun
Press Release, CICDHA, “China Commits to the United Nations Human Rights Council to Respect
Human Rights in its Foreign Investments” (Mar. 19, 2019).
–

’
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and consistency….”

full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, China’s
environmental and social safeguards as part of China’s external lending and outbound

State’s most recent national human rights plan of action (2012–

considered likely to violate “any international treaty conducted by China

with a foreign party” would not be approved. While in theory this allows

China Banking Regulatory Commission’s Green Credi
“hazards and risks [to] the environment and society that may be brought
institutions’ client
climate change”. Article 10 stipulates that Chinese banking
to “establish and constantly improve policies, systems and processes for
environmental and social risk management”, while article 11 requires

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

Management Initiative for China’s

aspects…”

—
—

A Human Rights Focus to Upgrade China’s International Lending,

China’s articulated philosophy and normative approach to what it asserts as the content of
called “rule of law based” sovereign

more deafening thus far is China’s silence on the role

–

’

’
’
’
Public Utilities, and Public Concerns: A Practitioner’s Perspective,

’

’
’
i’s Speech at the Opening of Belt and Road Forum
Leaders’ Roundtable of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Coop
’
Joint Communique of the Leaders’ Roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International

Proposals to Promote the “Belt and Road” Initiative
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transparency and accountability in the supposed ‘win win cooperation’
to forge with most of the world under the aegis of ‘development’ through the BRI. In April
for the first time that the BRI will “adopt widely

respected.”

relief from BRI projects, on the reasoning that “the BRI loans are not foreign aid…[Chi
need[s] to at least recoup principal and a moderate interest.”

it has listed in its BRI website. Other documents released in April 2019 along with China’s

of July 1, 2018, the Supreme People’s Court of China issued its “Regulations on Several
Issues Regarding the Establishment of International Commercial Courts” (one in

’
James Kynge and Sun Yu, “China faces wave of calls for debt relief on ‘Belt and Road’ projects”, The

’

China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative: Scope,
China’s Governance Approach to

—
—

Project finance refers to a “nonrecourse or limited recourse financing structure in which

collateral for debt.”

’

’

’

’
–

’

Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Undermining Human Right
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–

–

…A

directly affect the lives of most of the people that live on this planet.”
—

—
China’s r
—

–

’
‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative: Can a Bilaterally Negotiated ‘Globalization 2.0’ Int
’

(“distinguish ‘megaprojects’ from

China’s

none of the publicly available BRI official documents from China’s official websites indicate
what China’s actual debt repayment terms are, the unfortunate result is an “opaque build
of debt…[which could cause] risk[s] to the world economy.”
that “better fiscal transparency, political trust, and credit ratings are connected with a lower
cost of sovereign debt…higher corruption, bu
unemployment make sovereign rates increase.” Other researchers also affirm that “high
debt levels can limit a sovereign government’s capacity to provide social services necessary
term development strategies…[and] after a government defaults, the mechanisms for
the indebted country feeling as if they have been treated unfairly.”

both “
”
—

—

more or less autonomous subprojects. Further, ‘Global Megaprojects’
differing languages and institutions.”).
China’s Loans to Other Countries are Causing ‘Hidden’ Debt. That May be a Problem
’

’
’

’
’
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The World Bank’s

Bank’s CDD programs are committed to operate on “principles of
accountability, and enhanced local capacity.”

“Bilateral Documents” are little more than a collection of vision
—Malaysia’
(ECRL); Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Colombo Port; Pakistan’s China
Economic Corridor (CPEC); Laos’ Kunming Vientiane Railway; and Kazakhstan’s Khorgos
—

’

The World Bank’s Land of Kiosks: Community Driven

Malaysia’s East Coast Rail L

South China Sea with shipping routes in Malaysia’s western provinces, and two gas
The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) would connect Malaysia’s Port Klang on the Strait of

Construction Company, subject to the regulatory supervision of Malaysia’s Ministry of

even as Malaysia’s regional

Malaysia’s Canceled Belt and Road Initiative Pro
Malaysia Rethinks $20B “Belt and Road” Project

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

Malaysia’s Department of

Evolving Paradigms in Malaysia’s Regional Development Policy
Future of Malaysia’s China

environmental impact assessment. The 2017 EIA Report noted that “[l]and and property
construction phase…people affected by the
cohesion.”

Malaysia Rail Link committed to “provide early and adequate information to

ensure continuous engagement.”
environmental impacts during the construction phase would include “soil erosion and

related to public safety.”

sia Rail Link committed to “mainstreaming environmental protection into the

engagement with all stakeholders throughout the life of the Project.”
the Project’s implementation, for any environmental, social, and human rights impacts.
Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Colombo Port

nka’s

Sri Lanka’s Port Development and the Role of the BRI

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

reported that Sri Lanka’s environmental impact asse
defects due to “lack of environmental, social protection policies and proper post monitoring
plan…[as well as problems with the assessment process as to] lack of incorporate[ion] [of]
concepts in evaluation.”
The Hambantota Port Development Project is part of China’s seaport
the Indian Ocean that have been described as “win
–
oriented governance strategy.”

The Cost of China’s Belt and Road

’

’

’
Between Geoeconomics and Geopolitics: China’s Participation in the Seaport Constructions
Year Lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port

assign blame to Sri Lanka’s government for mishandling the port project altogether.

massive infrastructure through land reclamation near Sri Lanka’s capital of Colombo, for the
a “foreign direct investment (FDI) by CHEC Port City Colombo (Pvt) Ltd (the Project
(CCCC)…major components of Port City at a glance are: 1) total land area reclaimed 269
hectares…”

’

Enhancing China’s Overseas Investment Image through Public
’
Destiny of the Pearl: How Sri Lanka’s Colombo Consensus Trump
’
Chinese Firm Completes US$1.4 Billion Land Reclamation Works for Sri Lanka’s

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

for a vast array of regional infrastructure connectivity projects, spanning “integrated
transport and [information technology] systems…energy cooperation, spatial layout,
development…tourism cooperation…[livelihood cooperation], financial cooperation, and
human resource development.”

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

regarding CPEC’s non

’
’

’

’

’

CPEC’s Environmental Toll

(Apr. 18, 2018),
Belt One Road’ Model,
’

Pakistan Economic Corridor Show the Limitations of China’s ‘One
’

Pakistanis’ living standards.

Laos’ Kunming
China’s Yunnan provincial capital of Kunming and the Laotian capital of Vientiane,
project cost, since Laos remains “one of Southeast Asia’s poorest countries…[with annual
Gross Domestic Product of just USD$16 Billion]…[O]f the [estimated] USD$6 Billion cost
remaining 30 percent with loans from Chinese financial institutions.”
Vientiane Railway is intended to “connect south to lines in Thailand, Malaysia, and
Singapore.”
cial Times reported that this project was “carried out with little public
consultation. . . . Laos’s government has taken on $480m of loans from China’s Eximbank,
The amount is equivalent to about 2 per cent of Laos’s gross domestic
product. However, the IMF classifies Laos as a country with an ‘elevated’ risk of debt
project’s backers have not made the business plan public, so little is known

related business ecosystem.”

’
China’s US$7 Billion Railway Link to Laos is Almost Half Done, on Schedule to Begin Ser
–

Laos’s Belt and Road Project Sparks Questions Over China Ambitions

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

sources, and the stresses on Laos’ ability to

Kazakhstan’s Khorgos Gateway
The Khorgos Gateway has been described as “the biggest
world…connect(ing) Kazakhstan to China by rail. Khorgos will soon enter the record books
as home to the world’s biggest dry port. Perhaps appropriately, Khorgos occupies one of the
furthest points on Earth from any ocean.”

described as a “much less transformative project than its proponents believe…Khorgos is
ral Asia.”

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

society: the first is that there will be an ‘invasion’ of Chinese migrants who
questioning the border agreements and suddenly demand more land.”

’

rights impacts of Kazakhstan’s Khorgos Gateway likewise does not assuage any of the local
infusion of China’s vast surplus capital on

state’s governme
scrutiny by civil society organizations. The ‘democratic’ nature of the BRI is to be seen
BRI’s sovereign lender, on the assumption that BRI debtor governments functionally
‘democracy’ in financing development projects is problematic, and does not meet

and Borrowing are also particularly apropos with respect to China’s role as the sovereign

China’s Path Forward is Getting Bumpy

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

lender in the BRI, given its current largely “hands off” approach to how BRI debtor

markets and financial techniques, others less so.

The lender’s

make a realistic assessment of the sovereign borrower’s capacity to
Lending beyond a borrower’s reasonable capacity to repay not only
borrower’s situation, lenders should consider the broad and real

have a direct economic interest in assessing the borrower’s repayment
l lender’s geopolitical influence, however, will
involve other motivations…The desire to realize such benefits from a
borrower’s repayment capacity.

Lending decisions are critically

the loan…This monitoring should be transparent and not affect any
sovereign’s faculty to decide on its developmental priorities.

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

w to its BRI projects. By assuming legal responsibility as potentially the world’s

truly “win
cooperation” to realize the right to development, as defined in Article 1(1) of the 1986 United

—

treaty party to the ICESCR; the Paris Agreement; as part of China’s Third Universal Periodic
Review commitments to the Human Rights Council; as part of China’s own domestic rules

This reinforces China’s responsi

–

“States parties may be held directly responsible for the action or inaction of business entities:
(a) if the entity concerned is in fact acting on that State party’s instructions or is un
context of public contracts; (b) when a business entity is empowered under the State party’s

own.”

China’s ICESCR obligations may, in these circumstances, apply even for
trol and oversight by China’s government ministries as seen from the list of

At the very least, well beyond China’s voluminous non

in a climate where China’s promotion of the BRI does not include complete disclosure of all

the document vaguely referring only to China’s possible inclusion of “environmental and
social responsibilities…in [a] loan contract.”
to the host country’s
environmental policies and standards for evaluation, and “[w]hen the host country does not

–
’
–
China: ‘Belt and Road’ Projects Should Respect Rights: Commit to Transparency, Public Consultation at

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

be referred to.”
“a borrowing nation is unable to provide a bank or sovereign guarantee, it is possible that a
as a replacement for a sovereign guarantee.”
—
—
population’s rights to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health under
15 (especially when the natural resource is central to a local community’s identity, culture,
and way of life); as well as (4) the rights of the BRI debtor country’s population to

The Deforestation Risks of China’s Belt

Some policy practitioners argue that the BRI’s threat to human rights and good
’s model of development financing:

term financial consequences of China’s loans –
them, assuming the bills will come due on a future government’s watch…
known example of Belt and Road’s negative impact on
a country’s balance sheet. But Sri
—
—

dependence on China and expands Beijing’s influence. As a result,
—
even if future governments seek to exit Beijing’s orbit….
exert influence well beyond countries’ foreign policy choices. The

Beijing’s zeal to curb bribery and corporate malfeasance limited to its

—
—

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

China’s planned development of a “new digital Silk Road has received
equally troubling. China’s digital bluep

will serve to export elements of Beijing’s surveillance regime. Indeed,
China’s ZTE Corporation “sold
activity.” Today, Chinese tech giant Huawei is partnering with the
government of Kenya to construct “safe cities” that leverage thousands of
ameras feeding data into a public security cloud “to keep an
eye on what is going on generally” according to the company’s
promotional materials. Not all elements of China’s domestic surveillance
regime are exportable, but as the “New Digital Silk Road” ta

stifle free speech, at a minimum by strengthening Beijing’s ability to
willing to call out Beijing’s domestic human rights abuses, for instance,

confronting the choice between Belt and Road’s immediate –
–
may well follow Greece’s example. Similarly, companies dependent on
et are already acquiescing to Beijing’s demands –
as by firing an American employee who “liked” a pro
–

imagine government officials feeling similarly compelled.”

On China’s New Silk Road, Democracy Pays a Toll: China’s Vast
’

is “poised” to support a BRI that
…China’s leadership on climate action is helping to show the way.

China’s new cutting
and securing an agreement at last December’s United Nations Climate
— and will host next year’s second Global
Sustainable Transport Conference…

—
—

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

and our common commitment to leave no one behind.”

communities impacted by BRI development projects, taking into account China’s explicit
development projects is arguably well within the purview of China’s treaty obligations to

to prevent abuses of Covenant rights in a business entity’s supply c

Alignment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Sustainable Development Goals, Secretary

Development and China’s Belt and Road Initiative in

acts on indigenous peoples’ rights to land,

peoples’ own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior

individual and on communities’ enjoyment of Covenant rights, by

corruption of judges, human rights abuses are left unremedied.”

–

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

China’s ICESCR commitments—
—
domestic “laws, regulations, policies, and standards” that
protective coverage in China’s around 145 international investment agreements thus far.
These “in accordance with law”

’

’
Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the
–
Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
–
rnment of the People’s Republic of China, China –
People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China –
overnment of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of
–
Between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Uganda on the Reciprocal
–
Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Guyana on the
–
Between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the Government of the People’s Republic of
–

Comment No. 24, by purposely recognizing that the host State’s international enviro

communities’ participation, access, and transparency with respect to BRI project
—
—
President Xi Jinping’s articulated April 2019 commitmen
China’s binding international legal commitments under the
on Climate Change, China’s own domestic r
activities and foreign lending, and China’s specific voluntary commitments made to the

hand, China’s commitment of massive surplus funds as investment or sovereign loans is an

streams comparing the risks of incurring foreign debt and investment from the “Beijing
Consensus,” as opposed to historically dominant paradigms under the “Washington
” Both mo
—

hope that these projects truly redound to these populations’ rights to development.

simply about the narrower scope of “rights

to development,”

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

a country’s foreign lending and/or foreign investment policies, precisely because it imposes
al and cultural development “in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms [are realized]” or “that is consistent with or based on all human
rights and fundamental freedoms.”

to another form of “human rights imperialism” characterized by many scholars

to accept China’s vast credit and investment infusions,

—
—
—

—

corpus of individuals, groups, and communities that forms any State’s population. Assuming
making is somehow ‘imperialist’ because
—

’

that neither the “Beijing Consensus ” the “Washington Consensus ” or any other

—
—

g into account Chinese President Xi Jinping’s April 2019 declaration to align the
investment projects, China’s existing treaty commitments under the ICESCR, the
Agreement on Climate Change, China’s expressed support for Agenda 2030 for Sustainable
Development, as well as China’s voluntary commitments to the Human Rights Council
during China’s Third Universal Periodic Review, alongside the emerging or crystal

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

—
—

of its financing contracts for the BRI, ensuring that China’s responsibilities as a sovereign
BRI debtor states’
states’ many constituencies (and not just finance ministries) to ensure that the terms of BRI
of the BRI debtor state’s ability to pay, based on comprehensive due diligence including

project. China’s ICESCR obligations are treaty commitments that, as elab

development project could be remedied either under the BRI debtor state’s domestic law and
—

consultations, and the community’s shared ownership of oversight for project impacts—

projects. China has announced that Chinese international commercial courts in Xi’an,

the opportunity for affected individuals or communities’ direct recourse in the BRI contracts

China’s commitments to realize the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development—
—
ation in the Context of China’s Belt and Road Projects
Beginning of ‘Belt and Road’ Disputes Between China and its Partners?: As Beijing’s Ambitious Initiative Turns

Meet the 8 Chinese Judges Who’ll

CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

—

occur from BRI debtor states’ enforcement of environmental, labor, social, and all other
—
—

China’s “Beijing Consensus” model of development fi
as exemplified in the BRI, demonstrates a vast gulf thus far between China’s articulated
velopment, China’s domestic regulations
on overseas investment, and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s April 2019 declaration aligning

Shifting Sands in the International Economic System: “Arbitrage” in International
49 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1019, 1103 –

n the real face of ‘imperialism.’

